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  We develop a simple double marginalization model with complete information, in which 
an  original  manufacturer  of  a  pharmaceutical  product  faces  potential  competition  from 
parallel imports by a foreign exclusive distributor. The model suggests that parallel imports 
will never occur in the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium, as it will always be beneficial for 
the  manufacturer  to  monopolize  the  home  country  by  undercutting  the  price  of  the  re-
imported pharmaceutical product. However, the question as to whether it is optimal for the 
manufacturer to charge the monopoly price in the home country depends on the level of trade 
costs and the level of heterogeneity of the two countries, in terms of market size and price 
elasticity of demand. 
  For the purpose of further research, this paper suggests the introduction of asymmetric 
information with regard to local demand functions, in order to explain why parallel trade may 
actually occur in equilibrium. 
 
 
                                                 
*  This  paper  draws  upon  Section  3.2.2  of  my  doctoral  thesis  on  “Patent  protection  and  the  problem  of 
underinvestment in R&D for medicines for tropical diseases – An economic analysis of parallel imports, patents 
and alternative mechanisms to encourage R&D”. I wish to thank Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Thomas Eger, Pranab 
Bardhan, Stephen Maurer, Keith E. Maskus, Andrew T. Guzman, Robert Maness, Eberhard Feess, Nathalie 
Jorzik, Martina Samwer, Katherine Walker, Philipp Rock, Sönke Häseler and Jan Peter Sasse for their valuable 
comments. Any remaining errors are my own. 
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1   Introduction 
Parallel imports, also known as gray-market imports, are goods legitimately produced 
under protection of a copyright, trademark or patent, and that are placed into circulation in 
one country and then imported into a second country without the permission of the owner of 
the intellectual property rights attached to the product in the second country. For instance, it is 
permissible for a trading firm to purchase quantities of prescription drugs in Portugal and 
import them into Germany without the approval of the local distributor owning the licensed 
patent rights.
1 
Parallel imported products are not counterfeited or pirated but are legitimate products. 
However,  they  may  not  carry  the  original  producer’s  warranty  and  may  be  packaged 
differently. Moreover, parallel importing firms ordinarily purchase a product in one country at 
a  price  that  is  lower  than  the  price  at  which  the  product  is  sold  in  the  second  country 
(arbitrage between markets). 
  The ability of an owner of intellectual property rights to exclude parallel trade stems from 
the importing country’s treatment of exhaustion of intellectual property rights. On the one 
hand, under a regime of national exhaustion intellectual property rights end upon first sale 
within a country, and right-holders are awarded the right to prevent parallel imports from 
other  countries.  Hence,  right  owners  retain  full  rights  for  distributing  their  goods  either 
themselves or through authorized dealers; this also includes the right to exclude imports.
2 On 
the  other  hand,  a  regime  of  international  exhaustion  makes  parallel  imports  from  other 
countries legal, as rights are exhausted upon first sale anywhere. Countries permitting parallel 
imports do not provide rightful owners with full rights for distributing their goods themselves, 
effectively invalidating any right to control the import of goods in circulation abroad. A third 
option  is  regional  or  community  exhaustion.  Under  a  regime  of  regional  or  community 
exhaustion rights are exhausted upon first sale within any member country of the community 
and parallel trade is allowed within the community. However, parallel imports from a non-
member country are prohibited. 
  In particular, the regulation of parallel imports in the field of pharmaceuticals has become 
a  critical  issue  in  the  global  trading  system,  as  the  welfare  effects  of  parallel  imports  of 
pharmaceuticals are generally ambiguous.
3 In particular, there is tension between two major 
objectives of public policy. On the one hand, a major long-run public policy objective is to 
                                                 
1 See Maskus (2001, p. 1). 
2 See Maskus (2000b, pp. 208). 
3 See Maskus and Chen (2004) and Danzon and Towse (2003). See also Maskus (2001) and Ganslandt and 
Maskus (2004, pp. 1036). 
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stimulate  the  innovation  and  development  of  new  medicines  by  awarding  pharmaceutical 
producers  with  a  patent  on  new  medicines.  In  particular,  pharmaceutical  producers  shall 
benefit from the higher prices of medicines protected by a patent, in order to be able to cover 
high  R&D  costs.  On  the  other  hand,  public  policy  should  also  ensure  broad  access  to 
affordable existing medicines in the short-run. Hence there is a trade-off between access to 
affordable medicines in the short-run and higher (monopoly) drug prices to stimulate R&D in 
the long-run. 
  The  research-intensive  pharmaceutical  sector  relies  heavily  on  patents,  as  Mansfield 
(1986)  has  shown.
4  In  particular,  the  value  of  a  patent  depends  on  the  monopoly  power 
afforded in terms of scope for price differentiation, which depends on the existence of barriers 
to parallel trade. Put differently, the value of a patent is partly determined by the scope for 
price  discrimination  within  the  area  of  exhaustion.  Furthermore,  the  narrower  the  area  of 
exhaustion the greater is the scope for price differentiation, and thus the higher is ceteris 
paribus  the  value  of  a  patent.
5  Consequently,  advocates  of  strong  patent  rights  for  new 
pharmaceutical products support a global policy of banning parallel imports.
6 For instance, 
representatives  of  the  pharmaceutical  industry  argue  that  if  parallel  importation  of 
pharmaceuticals  were  allowed  it  would  reduce  profits  in  the  research-intensive 
pharmaceutical sector, and thus would reduce the incentives to invest in R&D for new drugs.
7 
Furthermore, they argue that this would slow down innovation of new pharmaceuticals. 
  Nevertheless,  policy  makers  in  many  developing  countries  not  endowed  with  the 
technical and non-technical input factors required for innovation support an open regime of 
parallel  imports.  In  particular,  they  place  a  larger  emphasis  on  the  affordability  of 
pharmaceuticals than on promoting R&D abroad, arguing that it is important to be able to 
purchase pharmaceuticals from the cheapest sources possible. Of course, the vast majority of 
new inventions in the world has been and is still generated by the pharmaceutical companies 
in the developed nations.
8 For instance, the big multinational pharmaceutical companies, in 
terms of world market sales, are all headquartered either in Europe or in the U.S., as Annex 
I.1 shows. 
                                                 
4 For instance, Mansfield (1986) in a ranking of industries’ reliance on patent protection for innovation showed 
that  the  pharmaceutical  sector  is  more  than  twice  as  dependent  on  patent  protection  as  the  next  sector 
(chemicals). See also Bale (1998). 
5 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004, p. 1037). 
6 For instance, see Barfield and Groombridge (1998). See also Bale (1998). 
7 For instance, Danzon (1998) argues that a segmented equilibrium with price-discriminating monopolies can be 
optimal from a welfare perspective. 
8 See Sykes (2002, p. 47). 
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  The opposition to restricting parallel trade in most developing countries reflects concerns 
that domestic prices for pharmaceuticals would actually be higher under price discrimination. 
However, as we will see in the following it is questionable whether this is a valid argument 
from  an  economic  point  of  view.  In  economic  parlance,  parallel  trade  of  pharmaceutical 
products  limits  the  scope  for  third-degree  price  discrimination  of  a  monopolistic 
pharmaceuticals  producer.
9  In  third-degree  price  discrimination,  a  monopolistic 
pharmaceuticals producer sells output to different people or to segmented markets at different 
prices, but individuals in the same segmented market or group pay the same price per unit of 
output.
10 If average income and price elasticities of demand differ across segmented markets, 
optimal prices for a monopolist are likely to be different in those locations. In general, the 
monopolist will charge relatively high prices in markets with low price elasticity of demand, 
typically in highly developed countries, and relatively low prices in markets with high price 
elasticity of demand, typically in developing countries. Parallel imports limit the scope for 
third-degree price discrimination in the sense that the price in a low income country with a 
high price elasticity of demand is likely to increase as a result of parallel trade, whereas the 
price in a high income country with a low price elasticity of demand is likely to fall.
11 
Section 2 of this paper outlines the legal framework regarding parallel trade. In particular, 
we focus on Article 6 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (henceforth, TRIPS Agreement) and on the regime of regional exhaustion in the EU. 
Section 3 gives an overview of the two main strands of the existing formal literature on 
parallel trade. The first strand of formal papers analyzes the determinants of parallel trade. 
However, the second strand involves the dynamic effects of parallel trade on the decision to 
invest in R&D for new products. 
In Section 4 this author contributes to the first strand of literature mentioned above and 
develops a new double marginalization model as a three-stage game of complete information, 
played between a monopolistic producer of pharmaceuticals in one country and an exclusive 
distributor in another country. In particular, I analyze the question as to why parallel imports 
in a game with complete information may actually occur in equilibrium. 
The paper concludes with some ideas for further research. In particular, it suggests the 
introduction of asymmetric information with regard to local demand functions, in order to 
                                                 
9 Throughout the analysis we assume that a patent on a new pharmaceutical product gives the manufacturing 
firm that holds the patent a temporary monopoly. 
10 See Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), and Hausman and MacKie-Mason (1988) for an 
analysis of the effect on social welfare of third-degree price discrimination. 
11 See Ganslandt, Maskus and Wong (2005, pp. 216). See also Sykes (2002, pp. 63) and Scherer (1980, pp. 316). 
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analyze the question whether, in a game with incomplete information, parallel imports occur 
in equilibrium. 
 
2   Legal Framework regarding Parallel Trade 
  Under a regime of national exhaustion of IPRs, an IPR owner can prevent competition 
resulting from the parallel import of his product from a foreign country where it is sold either 
by himself or by an authorized dealer.
12 For instance, the IPR owner can take action against a 
parallel  importing  firm  for  infringing  a  patent,  copyright  or  trademark.  Furthermore,  the 
owner can include a restriction notice in licensing and purchasing agreements in order to 
prevent parallel trade, i.e. by attaching a label to the product which indicates that the product 
is not for re-sale in its home country or by implementing supply quota.
13 However, the extent 
to which such private contractual means can be lawfully adopted depends on whether they are 
considered to be anticompetitive by prevailing competition laws.
14 
  In contrast, under  a regime of international exhaustion (regional  exhaustion), the  IPR 
owner looses his exclusive privilege after the first distribution of the product, with the result 
that parallel imports from abroad (from countries inside the region) are not prohibited. As we 
shall see in more detail in the following sections, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held in 
various cases that the free circulation of goods within the common market takes precedence 
over the protection of intellectual property rights and that parallel trade within the common 
market is legal, at least within very broad limits.
15 Furthermore, private contractual provisions 
in  licensing  and  purchasing  agreements  explicitly  prohibiting  parallel  trade  within  the 
common market would automatically be void on the grounds that these are incompatible with 
the common market.
16 
  In the remainder of the section, I shall first describe the treatment of the principle of the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights within the WTO framework focusing on Article 6 of 
                                                 
12 For instance, see Straus and Katzenberger (2002) for a comprehensive overview of the legal foundations of the 
different regimes of exhaustion of patent rights. 
13 See Holmberg et al. (2003) who report that quantity limits for parallel import products are highly significant 
for the Swedish market. See also “Pfizer Moves to Try to Stop Drugs From Canada“, The New York Times, 14 
January 2004. For an overview of reactive and proactive strategies of multinational companies to combat parallel 
trade  activities  see  Cavusgil  and  Sikora  (1988).  For  instance,  the  authors  identified  price  cutting,  supply 
interference, and acquisition of the re-importing firm as reactive strategies. Furthermore, the authors identified 
product  differentiation,  strategic  uniform  pricing,  establishing  legal  precedence,  and  lobbying  as  proactive 
strategies. See also Palia and Keown (1991). 
14 See Fink (2005, pp. 172). See also Gallini and Hollis (1999). 
15 Hereinafter the following references to cases are to those of the ECJ if not stated otherwise. See Case C-
187/80 Merck & Co. Inc. vs. Stephar B.V. and Petrus Stephanus Exler. See also Case C-56/64 Etablissements 
Consten S.A. and Grundigverkaufs-GmbH. vs. E.E.C. Commission. 
16 See Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 
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the TRIPS Agreement. The second part gives a description of the treatment of parallel trade in 
the EU. Finally, the third part elaborates on the different national legal frameworks regarding 
parallel trade, i.e. in the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
 
2.1 Parallel Trade and the WTO 
  In general, countries are free to determine their preferred exhaustion regime for each form 
of intellectual property rights. Put differently, countries can freely decide on whether to allow 
or ban parallel trade, as long as they are not bound by an international agreement. However, 
no international convention or multilateral agreement on intellectual property rights has so far 
mandated a particular regime of exhaustion of intellectual property rights.
17 
  The only provision in the various multilateral  agreements of the WTO that explicitly 
addresses the treatment of parallel trade is Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement. In particular, 
American negotiators in the Uruguay Round tried to incorporate a global standard of national 
exhaustion into the TRIPS Agreement, in order to ban parallel imports aimed at protecting 
innovative industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, as well as other industries, such as 
the music and film industries. However, it was impossible to reach such an agreement with 
regard to a global standard of national exhaustion, because the views on the net benefits of 
parallel imports were too divergent. For instance, some WTO members such as Switzerland 
and the USA tried to include the principle of national exhaustion in the Agreement, while 
other  countries  such  as  Australia,  India  and  New  Zealand  defended  the  principle  of 
international exhaustion.
18 Therefore, Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement simply prescribes 
that: 
 
“For the purposes of dispute settlement under this Agreement, subject to the provisions of 
Articles  3  and  4,  nothing  in  this  Agreement  shall  be  used  to  address  the  issue  of  the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.” 
 
Hence, it seems that the compromise reached in Article 6 is simply to exclude the treatment of 
parallel imports from dispute settlement and to preserve the territorial privilege for regulating 
parallel trade.
19 Furthermore, Paragraph 5(d) of the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
                                                 
17 See Fink (2005, pp. 173). 
18 See Gervais (2003, pp. 11). See also Chard and Mellor (1989), and Gallus (2005, pp. 78). 
19 See Gervais (2003, p. 11). See also Maskus (2001, p. 4) and Yusuf and Moncayo von Hase (1992). However, 
after failing to include the principle of national exhaustion in the TRIPS Agreement, the U.S. then exchanged 
commitments on limiting parallel trade with Singapore in the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, which 
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Public  Health  (hereafter  “Doha  Declaration”)  affirmed  this  interpretation.  In  particular,  it 
prescribes that: 
 
“The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the exhaustion of 
intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to establish its own regime for such 
exhaustion  without  challenge,  subject  to  the  MFN  and  national  treatment  provisions  of 
Articles 3 and 4.”
20 
  Indeed, the flexibility to allow parallel trade was crucially important for many developing 
countries, as they perceived parallel imports to be an effective antidote to concerns about 
potential price increases for pharmaceuticals, due to strengthened patent protection in the 
course of the ratification and implementation of the TRIPS Agreement.
21 Furthermore, many 
developing countries were in favor of permitting parallel trade, arguing that it would allow 




2.2 Parallel Trade in the EU 
  The  European  Union  (EU)  applies  a  regime  of  regional  exhaustion  to  all  fields  of 
intellectual property within the Community.
23 Put differently, exhaustion applies upon first 
sale anywhere in the EU. In particular, the ECJ has held that free circulation of goods within 
the common market takes precedence over protection of intellectual property rights.
24 For 
instance, in the initial case for patents, Merck vs. Stephar, the ECJ came to the conclusion that 
a holder of a patent who decides to market his product in two EU countries cannot prevent 
parallel trade between the two countries, i.e. by bringing summary proceedings against the 
parallel-importing firm for patent infringement,  despite differences in patent protection in 
                                                                                                                                                          
came into force in 2004, and with Australia in the U.S.-Australia Free-Trade Agreement, which came into force 
in  2005.  For  instance,  the  International  Intellectual  Property  Alliance  provides  a  detailed  list  regarding  the 
current  status  of  U.S.  negotiations  on  Free  Trade  Agreements  with  several  other  countries  on 
http://www.iipa.com./fta_issues.html (last visited January 11, 2007). See also Gallus (2005, pp. 77). 
20  The  full  text  is  available  on  http://www.wto.org/English/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm  (last  visited 
January 12, 2007). See also Garrison (2006, p. 53). 
21 See Maskus (2001, pp. 11) and Maskus (2000b, p. 209). See also Watal (2001). 
22 See Szymanski and Valletti (2005, pp. 714). See also Abbott (1998) who supported the developing countries’ 
point of view, arguing that a restriction on parallel trade was an unjustified inhibition of free trade. 
23  See  Case  C-15/74  Centrafarm  BV  and  Others  vs.  Sterling  Drug  Inc.,  and  Case  C-355/96  Silhouette 
International Schmiedt GmbH & Co. KG vs. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH . See also Barnard (2004, pp. 
162). See also Maskus (2000a, pp. 1272). 
24 See Ganslandt and Maskus (2004, pp. 1038). 
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those countries.
25 Furthermore, the primacy of free circulation of goods within the common 
market over patent protection has been upheld by the ECJ’s ruling in Merck vs. Primecrown. 
In  particular,  the  ECJ  held  that  the  existence  of  differential  national  price  regulations  in 
pharmaceuticals in the EU does not justify the prevention of parallel imports – i.e. by taking 
action against infringement of a patent – from EU countries with lower (regulated) prices to 
EU countries with higher (regulated) prices.
26 Indeed, varying national regulatory practices 
that result in differences in prices for the same pharmaceutical product across EU countries 
are a major cause for arbitrage, as parallel-importing firms are able to buy pharmaceutical 
products from wholesalers in low-price countries such as Portugal, Spain or Greece and re-
sell them in high-priced countries such as Germany, Sweden or the UK.
27 Recent evidence 
regarding parallel trade of pharmaceutical products within the EU shows that parallel trade is 
a considerable business activity. For instance, the York Health Economics Consortium (2003) 
estimated that the UK market for parallel-traded pharmaceutical products represented around 
£1,300 million (€2,000 million) in 2002. Furthermore, the consortium estimated that parallel-
traded pharmaceuticals accounted for around 10 per cent of the total drug bill in Denmark in 
2002.
28 
  Nevertheless, exhaustion in the EU has important limitations. Most importantly, the ECJ 
concluded in EMI vs. CBS and Silhouette vs. Hartlauer that exhaustion does not extend to 
countries  outside  the  common  market.
29  Hence,  the  ECJ  established  a  regime  of  regional 
exhaustion  or  “Community  exhaustion”  but  rejected  the  principle  of  international 
exhaustion.
30  Furthermore,  the  ECJ  established  in  Pharmon  vs.  Hoechst  that  regional 
exhaustion  does  not  extend  to  products  that  are  marketed  in  a  member  state  under  a 
compulsory license.
31 
  Another important issue with regard to potential restrictions for parallel trade within the 
common market is the question as to whether supply quotas for foreign wholesalers imposed 
by original manufacturers are illegal under Article 81 of the EC Treaty. Most importantly, the 
                                                 
25 See Case C-187/80 Merck & Co. Inc. vs. Stephar B.V. and Petrus Stephanus Exler. See also the initial cases 
for trademarks, Case C-56/64 Etablissements Consten S.A. and Grundigverkaufs-GmbH. vs. E.E.C. Commission, 
and for copyrights, Case C-78/70 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH. vs. Metro-SB-Grossmärkte GmbH 
& Co. K.G.. See also Ganslandt and Maskus (2004, pp. 1038). 
26 See Joined Cases C-267-268/95 Merck & Co. Inc. and Others vs. Primecrown Limited and Others. See also 
Case C-15/74 Centrafarm BV and others vs. Sterling Drug Inc . See also Wagener, Eger and Fritz (2006, p. 230), 
Danzon (1998, pp. 295) and Maskus (2000a, pp. 1272). 
27 See Kanavos and Costa-Font (2005, pp. 755). 
28 See also Valletti and Szymanski (2006, p. 501). 
29 See Case C-51/75 EMI Records Limited vs. CBS United Kingdom Limited. See Case C-355/96 Silhouette 
International Schmiedt GmbH & Co. KG vs. Hartlauer Handelsgesellschaft mbH. 
30 See also Szymanski and Valletti (2005, pp. 712). 
31 See Case C-19/84 Pharmon B.V. vs. Hoechst AG. See Maskus (2000a, pp. 1272). See also Ganslandt and 
Maskus (2004, pp. 1039). 
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ECJ  concluded  in  Bundesverband  der  Arzneimittel-Importeure  and  Commission  of  the 
European Communities vs. Bayer that unilateral supply quota systems are not necessarily 
prohibited under Article 81 of the EC Treaty, as long as they do not constitute a contractual 
agreement prohibiting parallel trade.
32 Put differently, unilateral restraints on sales from an 
original manufacturer to foreign wholesalers are not necessarily illegal under Article 81 of the 
EC Treaty. However, any contractual agreement explicitly prohibiting parallel trade within 
the common market would be void under Article 81 of the EC Treaty. 
  To sum up, on the one hand, the EU system basically allows parallel imports within its 
territory,  despite  differences  in  national  intellectual  property  regimes  and  national  price 
regulations,  as  long  as  the  product  has  not  been  marketed  in  a  member  state  under  a 
compulsory license. On the other hand, parallel imports from outside the EU are not allowed 
under the EU system, so that IPR owners can invoke their rights and prevent competition 
from parallel imports. 
 
2.3 National Legal Frameworks regarding Parallel Trade 
  Exhaustion policies vary widely between developed and developing countries and even 
among  developed  countries  themselves,  as  the  following  summary  shows.
33  Let  us  first 
consider national policies with regard to parallel trade in some high-income countries such as 
the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
  The U.S. has a mixed policy on parallel imports. Within its territory, the country employs 
what is known as the “first-sale doctrine”, under which rights of the seller or manufacturer are 
exhausted  when  a  good  has  been  first  placed  on  the  national  market  outside  the  vertical 
distribution chain.
34 Hence, price discrimination against American consumers is ruled out, as 
U.S.  firms  cannot  prevent  consumers  from  re-selling  goods  anywhere  within  the  United 
States. 
  With  regard  to  parallel  imports  in  trademarked  goods,  the  U.S.  applies  a  “common-
control exception”, affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
35 This rule allows trademark owners 
                                                 
32 See Joined cases C-2/01 P and C-3/01 P Bundesverband der Arzneimittel-Importeure e.V. and Commission of 
the European Communities vs. Bayer AG. See also Smits (2006, pp. 65). 
33 See Maskus (2000b, pp. 209). See also Fink (2005, pp. 173), Maskus and Chen (2005, p. 193, Table 8.1), and 
Maskus (2001, pp. 3). 
34 See U.S. Supreme Court case Bobbs-Merrill Co. vs.  Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908). The “first sale doctrine” was 
later codified in section 109(a) of the Copyright Act of 1976. See also Szymanski and Valletti (2005, pp. 712), 
and Maskus and Chen (2004, p. 553). 
35 See U.S. Supreme Court case K Mart Corporation vs. Cartier, 486 U.S. 281 (1987). See also Maskus (2001, p. 
5), Gallini and Hollis (1999, pp. 7), Palia and Keown (1991, pp. 49), Maskus and Chen (2004, pp. 553), and 
Kanavos et al. (2004, pp. 36). 
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to  block  parallel  imports,  i.e.  by  using  statutory  provisions  relating  to  the  exclusion  of 
imports,  except  when  the  foreign  and  U.S.  trademark  owners  are  in  a  parent-subsidiary 
relationship or when both the U.S. and foreign trade mark owners are owned by the same 
entity. Furthermore, the trademark owner’s ability to block parallel imports rests on his ability 
to demonstrate that the imported product is not identical in quality to the original product and 
that it could cause consumer confusion. One may argue that these principles suggest that 
parallel imports of pharmaceutical products are permitted, as they are identical to the original 
product; however, U.S. law explicitly prohibits the re-importation of pharmaceutical products 
unless the drug is imported by the original manufacturer of the drug (21 U.S.C. 381 (d)).
36 
  However, because of the large differences in prices for prescription drugs between the 
U.S. and Canada, parallel trade in pharmaceuticals became an important issue in the 2004 
U.S.  presidential  elections,  as  many  states  encouraged  American  consumers  to  buy  from 
parallel-trading  internet  pharmacies,  despite  the  dubious  legality  of  parallel  trade  in 
pharmaceuticals under federal law.
37 For instance, Graham and Robson (2000) estimated that 
brand-name drugs are significantly cheaper in Canada than in the U.S. at both the wholesale 
and retail level.
38 Indeed, parallel trade has become a considerable business activity, as recent 
IMS estimates suggest. For instance, compared to 2002, the value of U.S. re-importation of 
prescription drugs from Canada increased by 134 per cent to US$1.100 million in 2003.
39 
  However, other high-income countries such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand are 
substantially  more  open  to  parallel  trade  than  the  U.S..  In  Japan,  parallel  imports  in 
trademarked and patented goods are allowed with two exceptions.
40 First, parallel imports are 
not allowed in case the original sale of the product was subject to foreign price regulation. 
Second, parallel imports can be explicitly barred by contractual provisions. Another high-
income country that has a far more liberal view on parallel trade is Australia.
41 Furthermore, 
New  Zealand  applies  a  system  of  international  exhaustion  with  respect  to  copyright.
42 
                                                 
36 See the Prescription Drug Marketing Act of 1987. See Valletti and Szymanski (2006, p. 500). 
37 See Szymanski and Valletti (2005, pp. 713). See also Valletti and Szymanski (2006, p. 500). 
38  See  also  the  1998  U.S.  House  of  Representatives  Minority  Staff  International  Report  that  compared  the 
international  prices  of  prescription  drugs.  In  particular,  the  report  concluded  that  prices  for  pharmaceutical 
products in Maine were 70 per cent higher than in Canada and 102 per cent higher than in Mexico. 
39 See http://open.imshealth.com/IMSinclude/i_article_20040726.asp (last visited, January 10, 2007). 
40 For instance, see BBS Kraftfahrzeugtechnik AG. vs. K.K. Racimex Japan, K.K. Jap Auto Products (Japanese 
Supreme Court decision from July 1
st, 1997). 
41 For instance, see the Australian Copyright Amendment (Parallel Importation) Bill 2002 to the Copyright Act 
1968,  available  on  http://www.aph.gov.au/LIBRARY/Pubs/bd/2001-02/02bd133.htm  (last  visited  January  25, 
2007). 
42 See Copyright (Removal of the Prohibition on Parallel Importing) Amendment Act 1998. See also Copyright 
(Parallel Importation of Films and Onus of Proof) Amendment Act 2003, available on the New Zealand Ministry 
of Economic Development homepage, http://www.med.govt.nz/ (last visited January 11, 2007). See also Fink 
(2005, p. 174). 
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However,  the  Copyright  Amendment  Act  2003  reintroduced  a  partial  ban  on  the  parallel 
importation of films. 
  Furthermore,  as  the  summary  of  exhaustion  regimes  of  various  developing  and  least-
developed countries in Annex I.2 shows, the exhaustion regimes and thus the restraints on 
parallel trade vary widely in the developing world. A large number of countries, such as 
Argentina,  India  and  South  Africa,  apply  a  regime  of  international  exhaustion.
43  More 
specifically, Argentina and South Africa have enacted laws permitting parallel imports of 
pharmaceutical products.
44 However, just to name a few, countries such as Brazil, Mexico, 
and Nigeria adopt a regime of national exhaustion of IPRs and thus allow the right holder to 
prevent parallel trade.
45 
  To summarize, exhaustion regimes and thus the restraints on parallel trade vary widely 
between  developed  and  developing  countries  and  even  amongst  developed  countries. 
Furthermore, these differences in exhaustion regimes and the corresponding divergent views 
on the net benefits of parallel imports have created a fierce debate in recent years. However, 
as we shall see in the following sections, the law and economics approach to parallel trade 
appears to be a highly attractive and promising field of research, given the complex legal and 
economic issues involved, which can significantly contribute to this debate. 
 
3   Literature on Parallel Trade and R&D for Pharmaceuticals 
  Before proceeding with the model, I will give an overview of the two main strands of the 
existing  formal  literature  on  parallel  imports.
46  First,  the  vast  majority  of  formal  papers 
applying  game-theoretic  tools  analyzes  the  determinants  of  parallel  imports,  i.e.  price 
discrimination  by  monopolistic  manufacturers,  vertical  price  control  by  multinational 
enterprises or national price regulations. However, the second and limited strand of literature 
involves  the  dynamic  effects  of  parallel  trade  on  the  decision  to  invest  in  R&D  for  new 
products,  which  is  certainly  a  crucially  important  issue  for  the  research-intensive 
pharmaceutical industry. 
 
                                                 
43 See Kanavos et al. (2004, p. 39). 
44 See Section 15C of the South African Medicines and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, 1997. See 
also Maskus (2001, pp. 5). 
45  See  the  analysis  of  the  intellectual  property  laws  of  over  70  developing  and  least-developed  countries 
undertaken by Thorpe (2002). 
46 For an overview of less formal policy-oriented reviews on parallel trade see Szymanski and Valletti (2005, pp. 
715). See Tarr (1985), Danzon (1998), Darbà and Rovira (1998), NERA (1999), and OECD (2002). 
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3.1 The Determinants of Parallel Trade 
  Maskus (2000a and 2000b) provides an excellent overview of the economic theories on 
the causes of parallel trade and the main arguments in favour of banning parallel imports. 
First, in many circumstances efficient international distribution of goods and services 
requires  multinational  enterprises  that  typically  build  markets  through  exclusive  territorial 
dealership  rights,  in  order  to  vertically  control  the  operations  of  their  official  licensees. 
Nevertheless, in foreign markets it may be difficult to enforce private contractual provisions 
prohibiting sales outside the authorized distribution chain, so that parallel trade may occur.
47 
In particular, Maskus and Chen (2004) elaborate on this idea and offer a sophisticated theory 
of parallel imports in the context of vertical price controls.
48 Maskus and Chen (2004) analyze 
the  nature  of  contractual  relationships  between  a  domestic  manufacturer  and  a  foreign 
independent  and  exclusive  distributor  through  which  the  manufacturer  sells  his  product 
abroad,  in  order  to  determine  the  optimal  level  of  parallel  trade.  In  particular,  the 
manufacturer offers the distributor a two-part wholesale tariff consisting of a wholesale price 
and a franchise fee. The analysis suggests that the possibility of parallel trade affects the 
manufacturer’s  pricing  decision  when  fixing  the  wholesale  price  it  charges  the  foreign 
distributor. Furthermore, the threat of parallel trade may reduce vertical pricing efficiency and 
thus reduce social welfare. However, Maskus and Chen (2004) conclude that the effect of 
parallel trade on global welfare is not unambiguous. In fact, they show that global welfare is 
U-shaped with respect to the cost of engaging in parallel trade, i.e. transportation costs. First, 
suppose that parallel trade costs are very low, i.e. transportation costs tend toward zero. In this 
case, Maskus and Chen (2004) conclude that the manufacturer cannot deter parallel trade in 
equilibrium by raising the wholesale price and thus that a welfare-reducing distortion in the 
vertical  pricing  scheme  is  not  created.  Put  differently,  parallel  trade  has  good  welfare 
properties if trade costs are sufficiently low, as it reallocates goods between the two countries 
without  creating  welfare-reducing  distortions  in  the  vertical  pricing  scheme.  However, 
consider now the other extreme case, that parallel trade costs are so high that parallel trade is 
not feasible. In this case, the authors conclude that parallel trade is not a real threat and that 
the manufacturer sets an efficient wholesale price. If, however, trade costs are neither too low 
nor too high the manufacturer can deter parallel trade by raising the wholesale price and thus 
reducing  vertical  pricing  efficiency.  Finally,  the  authors  suggest  that  the  optimal  policy 
                                                 
47 See Maskus (2000a, p. 1277). See also Maskus and Chen (2002). 
48 See also Gallini and Hollis (1999) who explore the nature of the contractual relationships between trademark 
or copyright owners and authorized distributors that may employ trademark and copyright law to prevent parallel 
trade. 
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regarding parallel trade shall either reduce any existing trade barriers and thus trade costs as 
much as possible or raise trade costs as much as possible. However, the optimal policy should 
not leave trade costs at some intermediate value.
49 
A  second  determinant  for  parallel  trade  is  that  parallel  importing  firms  have  the 
incentive to free ride on investments in marketing as well as on the before- and after-sales 
services  of  official  licensees  and  authorized  distributors.
50  For  instance,  assume  that  an 
authorized distributor in the territorial market A invests in marketing and sales activities that 
are associated with the sale of a certain product in market A. Consequently, the distributor in 
market A will charge a markup on top of the procurement cost so that he can earn a return on 
those investments. Furthermore, suppose that the marketing and sales activities mentioned 
above are substantially cheaper in the territorial market B, or that they are not even provided 
by the authorized distributor in territorial market B. In this case, parallel importing firms that 
purchase  the  product  in  market  B  and  re-sell  the  product  in  market  A  free  ride  on  the 
investments in marketing and sales services made by the official distributor in market A.
51 
  Third,  in  some  industries  such  as  the  pharmaceutical  industry  national  governments 
intervene  in  private  markets  by  regulating  prices  in  order  to  achieve  particular  social 
objectives, i.e. to make medicines affordable for low-income consumers and to limit public 
health  budgets.  As  these  government  interventions  result  in  significant  international  price 
differences there is a potential for arbitrage between markets, as parallel importing firms may 
purchase a certain product in more regulated (lower-price) markets and re-sell the product in 
less regulated (higher-price) markets.
52 In a recent paper, Bordoy and Jelovac (2005) identify 
international differences between the regulatory regimes in the pharmaceuticals area as a main 
determinant  of  international  price  discrimination.
53  In  particular,  the  authors  explore  the 
welfare implications of permitting parallel trade of pharmaceutical products in a model in 
which countries may differ along two dimensions. First, countries may be different in terms of 
governmental health insurance reimbursement policies, as is reflected in the patient’s level of 
co-payment for buying a pharmaceutical product. Second, countries may differ in terms of 
drug needs, as is reflected in the distribution of the valuations for the pharmaceutical product 
among their population. In particular, Bordoy and Jelovac (2005) show that parallel trade 
increases total welfare when countries share the same health system and only differ in the 
distribution of the valuations for the pharmaceutical product among their population. In this 
                                                 
49 See Maskus and Chen (2004, p. 561). 
50 See also Chard and Mellor (1989) and Barfield and Groombridge (1998). 
51 See Maskus (2000a, pp. 1275) , Maskus (2000b, pp. 212), and Fink (2005, pp. 176). 
52 See also Danzon (1997). 
53 See also Szymanski and Valletti (2005, pp. 715). 
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case, parallel trade leads to an efficient re-allocation of consumption from consumers with a 
relatively  low  valuation  of  the  pharmaceutical  product  in  the  exporting  country  towards 
consumers  with  a  relatively  high  valuation  of  that  product  in  the  importing  country.  If, 
however, the countries only differ in terms of their health insurance reimbursement policies, 
parallel trade decreases total welfare, as it re-allocates drug consumption from consumers 
with  relatively  high  valuation  of  the  pharmaceutical  product  towards  consumers  with 
relatively low valuation of that drug. However, Bordoy and Jelovac (2005) do not consider 
the dynamic effects of parallel trade on R&D for new pharmaceutical products. 
  In  a  recent  paper,  Ganslandt  and  Maskus  (2004)  also  take  into  account  international 
differences between the regulatory regimes in the pharmaceuticals area. However, the authors 
in  particular  focus  on  the  econometric  analysis  of  the  price  impact  of  parallel  trade  in 
pharmaceutical products within the European Union. Interestingly, despite the importance of 
parallel  trade  from  a  welfare  perspective,  their  analysis  is  the  first  systematic  economic 
investigation  into  the  price  impacts  of  parallel  trade  in  pharmaceuticals.  In  particular, 
Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) explore the effect of the entry of parallel traders on the prices 
of pharmaceutical producers in Sweden from 1994 to 1999. Prior to Sweden’s entry into the 
European  Union  on  1  January  1995  parallel  imports  of  pharmaceuticals  were  prohibited. 
However, after its entry Sweden had to adopt the EU-wide principle of exhaustion of patent 
distribution rights and thus permitted parallel trade. Therefore, the Swedish market provides a 
natural example for testing and estimating the effect of the exogenous shock to the patented 
pharmaceutical market, due the introduction of parallel trade. Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) 
found that the prices of pharmaceutical products subject to competition from parallel trade fell 
relative to other pharmaceutical products over the period 1994-1999. In particular, the authors 
came to the conclusion that parallel trade significantly reduced prices, by 12-19 per cent, 
relative  to  other  pharmaceutical  products  not  subject  to  competition  from  parallel  trade. 
Arguably, parallel trade represents a significant form of competition in Sweden. 
  Finally,  Richardson  (2002)  analyzes  a  two-stage  game  in  which  welfare-maximizing 
national governments simultaneously choose whether to permit or prohibit parallel trade in 
the first stage. In the second stage, a monopolistic manufacturer of a homogenous good sets a 
price  for  that  good  in  each  country.  By  assumption,  welfare  in  the  country  in  which  the 
monopolist is located is given by the sum of the domestic consumer surplus and the global 
profits  of  the  monopolist.  However,  welfare  in  all  other  countries  is  simply  domestic 
consumer surplus. The author shows that it is a global Nash equilibrium for all countries to 
permit parallel trade, resulting in a globally uniform price for the product. The idea behind 
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this result is the following. On the one hand, the countries that prefer to permit parallel trade 
are those countries that would be discriminated against if parallel trade were prohibited, i.e. 
high-price countries with a relatively low price elasticity of demand. Those countries can 
prevent price discrimination by permitting parallel trade. On the other hand, those countries 
that might favour discrimination, i.e. low-price countries with a relatively high price elasticity 
of demand, cannot enforce price discrimination on a global scale when high-price countries 
permit parallel trade. Finally, he examines more realistic settings, taking tariffs and lobbying 
by producers into account in order to analyze the question as to why barriers to parallel trade 
can  actually  be  observed  in  practice.  However,  Richardson  (2002)  does  not  take  into 
consideration the dynamic effects of parallel trade on the monopolist’s decision to invest in 
R&D for new products. 
 
3.2 Dynamic Effects of Parallel Trade on the Investment in R&D 
  As  I  have  already  mentioned  earlier,  the  question  as  to  how  much  a  monopolistic 
manufacturer is willing to invest in R&D for new products is clearly of crucial importance to 
the research-intensive pharmaceutical industry. However, the literature on this issue is rather 
limited. To the best of my knowledge, Valletti and Szymanski (2006), Szymanski and Valletti 
(2005), Valletti (2006), Rey (2003), and Li and Maskus (2006) are the few exceptions of 
formal papers that look at the dynamic aspects of parallel trade in the context of R&D for new 
medicines. 
  In particular, this issue has been addressed in a recent paper by Valletti and Szymanski 
(2006)  who  have  extended  the  well-known  analysis  of  Malueg  and  Schwartz  (1994)  by 
endogenizing the quality of the good sold. More specifically, Valletti and Szymanski (2006) 
consider a model of product innovation in which a higher investment in R&D enables the 
manufacturer to discover products with higher quality. In particular, Valletti and Szymanski 
(2006) analyze a two-stage game in which a manufacturer chooses the quality of the product 
sold in the first stage and then chooses prices in the second stage. Furthermore, Valletti and 
Szymanski (2006) discuss the following basic trade-off between the positive ex post welfare 
properties of parallel trade, and the negative ex ante impact of parallel trade on aggregate 
welfare, respectively. In the second stage of the game, taking the level of product quality as 
fixed, a uniform pricing regime induced by parallel trade ex post results in higher aggregate 
welfare as long as demand dispersion across markets is sufficiently low. However, in the first 
stage of the game, the threat of parallel trade reduces ex ante the incentive to invest and thus 
results in lower product quality. 
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  In  a  recent  paper,  Szymanski  and  Valletti  (2005)  analyze  the  policy  implications  of 
parallel trade in a model of vertical product differentiation with endogenous product quality. 
However, Szymanski and Valletti (2005) also take into account the possibility that national 
governments may impose price caps as well as compulsory licences on patented products. 
Szymanski and Valletti (2005) come to the conclusion that parallel trade entirely destroys the 
incentives to invest in R&D for new products if the national government of a foreign country 
issues a compulsory license on the patented product and unilaterally sets a fixed price equal to 
marginal cost to be paid to the patent holder. If, however, the manufacturer has the option to 
either supply a high-quality product or a low-quality product to the foreign country and the 
foreign government offers the manufacturer a binding contract to issue a compulsory license 
at  a  capped  price  only  for  the  low-quality  product,  then  parallel  trade  has  no  effect  on 
investment incentives.
54 
  In another recent game-theoretic article, Valletti (2006) analyzes the question as to how a 
uniform  pricing  regime  induced  by  parallel  trade  ex  ante  affects  the  incentives  of  a 
monopolistic  manufacturer  of  pharmaceuticals  to  invest  in  R&D  for  new  pharmaceutical 
products where the level of investment affects the quality of the new pharmaceutical product. 
Valletti assumes that the markets in which the manufacturer sells his products differ in terms 
of marginal cost of manufacturing and delivering the product as well as in consumer demand 
in terms of the maximum willingness-to-pay of consumers. However, in his analysis of the 
incentives to invest in R&D, Valletti reaches the conclusion that two trade-offs arise. On the 
one hand, when differential pricing is demand-based, uniform pricing induced by parallel 
trade  has  good  ex  post  welfare  properties  but  bad  ex  ante  properties  in  terms  of  lower 
incentives to invest in R&D in order to obtain a better-quality product. On the other hand, 
when differential pricing is cost-based, uniform pricing induced by parallel trade has bad ex 
post welfare properties but good ex ante properties in terms of higher incentives to invest in 
R&D in order to obtain a better-quality product. 
  Rey (2003) provides another formal analysis that looks at the dynamic aspects of parallel 
trade. As in most countries pharmaceutical products are not directly purchased by consumers 
but  by  national  governments  at  a  regulated  price,  Rey  (2003)  analyzes  the  relationship 
between pharmaceutical companies and national governments in a game where two national 
governments H and L contribute towards spurring investment through regulated prices. On the 
one hand, government H has a high willingness to pay and places strong emphasis on high 
R&D for new medicines. On the other hand, government L has a low willingness to pay and 
                                                 
54 See Szymanski and Valletti (2005, p. 735). 
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places less emphasis on high R&D for new medicines. In particular, the author shows that, 
once  parallel  trade  is  permitted,  there  is  an  equilibrium  where  government  H  reduces  its 
contribution to R&D and sets a lower price, while government L maintains the same policy as 
in the absence of parallel trade. Put differently, in this equilibrium parallel trade leads to a 
uniform alignment on the lowest level of R&D, which adversely affects both countries due to 
reduced incentives to invest in R&D for new medicines. 
  Finally, in a recent article Li and Maskus (2006) extend the model set out by Maskus and 
Chen (2004), as mentioned above, to a framework with endogenous investment in process 
innovation,  in  order  to  analyze  the  impact  of  parallel  trade  on  cost-reducing  R&D  in  a 
vertical-pricing model in which a manufacturer invests in cost-reducing R&D and sells its 
product in another market through a distributor. In particular, they show that the distortions 
associated with parallel trade reduce the monopolist’s incentive to invest in cost-reducing 
R&D. 
  However, I shall contribute to the first strand of formal literature on the determinants of 
parallel  trade,  with  my  double  marginalization  model  to  be  elaborated  in  the  following 
sections. Moreover, two follow-up papers shall focus on the dynamic effects of parallel trade 
on the investment in R&D.  
 
4   Double Marginalization Game with Complete Information 
4.1 The model 
  This  paper  develops  a  three-stage  double  marginalization  game  with  complete 
information.
55 Player One is a monopolistic manufacturing pharmaceutical firm located in 
country  A,  henceforth  m.  Player  Two  is  a  single  authorized  independent  firm  located  in 
country B, henceforth r, and is responsible for the distribution and retail of the manufacturer’s 
product. We  assume that efficient international  distribution of the pharmaceutical product 
requires  the  manufacturer  to  build  a  market  in  country  B  through  exclusive  territorial 
dealership  rights.
56  For  instance,  suppose  that  the  exclusive  distributor  in  country  B  has 
already  established  costly  distribution  channels.
57  Furthermore,  we  assume  that  the  two 
                                                 
55 See Feess (2000, pp. 319) for an excellent introduction on monopoly theory. See also Weise, Brandes, Eger 
and Kraft (2005, pp. 305). See also Fudenberg and Tirole (1996, pp. 65). 
56 See Maskus and Chen (2002, 2004) who originally formulated the theory of parallel imports in the context of 
vertical price controls. 
57  Furthermore,  as  noted  by  Maskus  (2000b,  p.  213),  exclusive  territorial  dealership  rights  facilitate  the 
manufacturer’s monitoring of marketing efforts as well as the enforcement of product quality in foreign markets. 
One may also argue that the exclusive distributor can collect information on local tastes at lower costs than the 
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countries differ in per capita income and in price elasticity of demand for a new medicine. 
The  main  purpose  of  this  model  is  to  analyze  the  pricing  strategies  of  a  producer  of 
pharmaceuticals  and  an  exclusive  distributor.  In  particular,  we  analyze  the  question  as  to 
whether parallel imports may occur in equilibrium or not. 
  The strategies available to the manufacturer and the distributor are the different prices 
they might charge. We will assume that negative prices are not feasible, but that any non-
negative  price  can  be  charged.
58  Thus  the  strategy  space  of  the  manufacturer  can  be 
represented  as  [ ) 0 m S , = ∞ ,  non-negative  real  numbers.  A  typical  strategy  for  the 
manufacturer is to choose a non-negative price.
59 The strategy space of the distributor can be 
represented  as  [ ) 0 r S , = ∞ .  Moreover,  we  assume  that  the  payoff  functions  for  the 
manufacturer and the distributor are simply their profit. The timing of the game is as follows: 
  In the first stage, the manufacturing firm chooses the wholesale price 
w
B p  at which he 
sells the pharmaceutical product to the distributor in country B. 
  In the second stage, the distributor chooses the retail price  B p  in country B. 
In the third stage, the monopolist and the exclusive distributor simultaneously choose the 
price  at  which  they  sell  the  product  in  country  A  in  a  Bertrand  model  of  duopoly.
60 We 
assume that the product re-imported by the distributor from country B to country A is a perfect 
substitute for the product sold by the manufacturing firm in country A.  
                                                                                                                                                          
manufacturer and that the distribution process exhibits economies of scale (Gallini and Hollis (1999, p. 2)). 
Hence, in the presence of large set-up costs of distribution channels, large costs of collecting information on 
local tastes and economies of scale in distribution, it can be an efficient means for the manufacturer to leave the 
responsibility for distribution and retail of the product with the single independent distributor. Indeed, many 
multinational firms build international marketing and production networks, maintain head offices in various 
countries and are organized around subsidiaries which have significant decision-making power for the local 
market. 
58 For instance, assume that disposal costs are equal to zero. 
59 See Gibbons (1992, pp. 55). 
60 One may argue that the application of a Cournot quantity competition framework instead of a Bertrand price 
competition would be more suitable to model the strategic interaction at the third stage. However, from the 
author’s point of view, Bertrand’s approach has a certain modeling advantage over the Cournot setup and seems 
to be a better approximation to reality in the pharmaceutical industry for various reasons. First, as already noted 
earlier, parallel trade is an important issue in the context of third-degree price discrimination, as parallel trade 
erodes the monopolist’s ability to discriminate prices across markets. Hence, one may argue that prices and not 
quantities should be the decision variables in a model that elaborates on these issues in the first place. Second, 
since prices are the decision variables in our model and not just an endogenous consequence of the firms’ output 
decisions, we do not need to resort to any additional mechanism such as an (artificial) auctioneer to determine 
the market-clearing price (Vega-Redondo (2003, pp. 153). Put differently, the main modeling advantage of the 
Bertrand setup is that it includes an explicit description of all components required for understanding how the 
market actually operates,  whereas the Cournot framework resorts to an additional theoretical mechanism to 
determine  the  market-clearing  price.  Finally,  since  the  marginal  cost  of  production  in  the  pharmaceutical 
industry is negligibly small, one may also argue that capacities and output can be changed relatively easily 
compared to other industries. Hence, it may not be possible to vindicate the Cournot setup on the grounds of the 
well-known argument originally formulated by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) that - by introducing capacity 
constraints - a two-stage game in which firms simultaneously choose capacities in the first stage and (Bertrand) 
prices in the second stage is equivalent to a one-stage Cournot game. 
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  Consider a model with two countries A and B. Demand for a specific pharmaceutical 
product in country A is 
 
A A A D ( p ) a bp γ = −                                    (1) 
 
with  1 γ > . pA denotes the price in country A. Furthermore, b is proportional to the marginal 
utility of money.
61 The pharmaceutical product is produced by a monopolistic manufacturing 
firm that holds a patent on the medicine in both countries. For simplicity, we assume that 
marginal  costs  of  production  c  are  equal  to  zero  in  both  countries.  This  is  a  common 
assumption in models that deal with the strategic decisions of pharmaceutical companies, as 
the marginal cost of production are negligibly small compared to the cost of research and 
development. Demand for the pharmaceutical product in Country B is  
 
B B B D ( p ) a bp = − .                                    (2) 
 
γ  is a measure for the homogeneity of the two  countries.  If  γ  tends towards 1 the two 
countries are virtually homogenous. Put differently, the higherγ  the more heterogeneous the 
two countries are. 
  As  1 γ > , we can see from (1) and (2) that the price elasticity of demand
62 in country A, 
E
A(p), is lower than the price elasticity of demand in country B, E
B(p), for any given price p as  
 
A B bp bp
E ( p) E ( p)
a bp a bp γ
= < =
− −
.                          (3) 
 
Thus, standard economic theory tells us that, in the absence of parallel imports, the single 
manufacturer engages in third-degree price discrimination and sets a price in country A that 
exceeds the price in country B.
63 Put differently, the larger the market and the more inelastic 
                                                 
61 See Gansland and Maskus (2004, p. 1040). For instance, consider a linear-quadratic utility function such as 
2 2 U( x,y) x x / ( y) α β υ = − + . In this case, the system of demand functions mentioned above can be obtained 
approximately from the linear-quadratic utility function, as long as the expenditure on x is a relatively small 
share of the consumer’s budget and a / α β =  and b (m)/ υ β ′ = , assuming that  0 '(m) υ >  and  0 ''(m) υ < . 
62 See Schäfer and Ott (2004, pp. 71) for a definition of the price elasticity of demand. See also Varian (1996, pp. 
266) and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (2005, pp. 32). 
63 In third-degree price discrimination, the monopolist sells output to different people or segmented markets at 
different prices, but individuals in the same segmented market or group pay the same price per unit of output. 
For instance, different admission prices for students or senior citizens in cinemas, theaters, amusement parks etc. 
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demand is, the higher is the price. Small markets with elastic demand curves receive the 
product at a lower price. 
  Furthermore,  we  assume  that  there  is  an  exclusive  distributor  in  country  B  that  is 
officially  approved  by  the  authorities  in  country  A  for  re-importing  the  quantities  of  the 
pharmaceutical product he can buy from the monopolistic manufacturing firm in country A. 
Hence the distributor sells to consumers in country B at first, but may also engage in parallel 
trade from country B to country A. We also assume that arbitrage by individual consumers 
between B and A is prohibited. We moreover suppose that the marginal costs of engaging in 
parallel  trade  are  t.  For  instance,  the  costs  of  re-packaging  are  incurred  by  the  parallel-
importing distributor as well as other parallel trade-specific transaction costs such as import 
duties on parallel trade.
64 Furthermore, we assume that the parallel import product is a perfect 
substitute for the product sold by the original pharmaceutical producer in country A. 
 
4.2 Analysis 
  Before we proceed to the analysis of the three-stage double marginalization game with 
complete information as outlined in the previous section – this game being played between a 
monopolistic manufacturer in country A and an exclusive distributor in country B in order to 
endogenously derive the prices charged in country A and country B –  consider the following 
two benchmark cases: 
  In the first case to be elaborated in section 4.2.1, the question as to how the manufacturer 
would choose prices for maximizing profits if he directly served customers in both countries 
and parallel imports were prohibited is analyzed. Hence, we first analyze the manufacturer’s 
optimal decision in the absence of an exclusive distributor in country B and thus without 
potential competition from parallel imports as a first benchmark. 
  In the second case to be elaborated in section 4.2.2, a two-stage double marginalization 
game  with  complete  information  played  between  the  manufacturer  in  country  A  and  the 
distributor in country B is analyzed. The manufacturing firm can engage in the retail of the 
pharmaceutical product in country A, but can only sell the product in country B through a 
distributor. Furthermore, the distributor in country B has a monopoly on the retailing business 
in country B. However, we assume that parallel imports are not allowed, i.e. under a regime of 
national exhaustion of intellectual property rights. 
                                                                                                                                                          
are typical examples for third-degree price discrimination. See Varian (1999, pp. 440) for a general model of 
third-degree price discrimination. 
64 See NERA (1999, pp. 15). See also Maskus and Chen (2004, p. 566) and Li and Maskus (2006, p. 447). 
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  Finally,  we  will  relax  the  latter  assumption  in  the  analysis  of  the  three-stage  double 
marginalization game with complete information which is to be elaborated in section 4.2.3, in 
which potential competition may arise from parallel imports in order to answer the question as 
to whether parallel imports may occur in equilibrium or not. 
 
4.2.1 Third-degree price discrimination under a regime of national 
exhaustion 
We assume that parallel imports are prohibited, that there is no exclusive distributor in 
country B and that the manufacturing firm can engage in third-degree price discrimination. 
The manufacturing firm maximizes profits generated in country A according to  
 
A
A A p max( a bp )p γ −                                     (4) 
 
which gives the following first order condition 
 
2 0 A a bp γ − = .                                      (5) 
 









= .                                        (6) 
 
Furthermore, the manufacturing firm maximizes profits generated in country B according to  
 
B
B B p max(a bp )p −                                     (7) 
 
which gives the following first order condition 
 
B a 2bp 0 − = .                                      (8) 
 
The profit maximizing price is consequently 
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= .                                        (9) 
 
By looking at (6) and (9) it becomes apparent that in the case of national exhaustion and price 
discrimination the manufacturing firm will set a price 
*
A p  in country A that exceeds the price 
*
B p  in country B, as the price elasticity of demand in country A is lower than that in country B, 






D ( p ) a b
b
γ γ
γ   = − =  
 
.                            (10) 
 





D ( p ) a b
2b 2
  = − =  
 
.                              (11) 
 
Correspondingly,  total  profit 
* *
A B ( p ,p ) Π ,  defined  as  the  sum  of  the  profit  generated  in 
country A, 
*
A A ( p ) Π , and the profit generated in country B, 
*
B B ( p ) Π , is given by 
 
* * * * * * * *
A B A A B B A A A B B B ( p ,p ) ( p ) ( p ) p D ( p ) p D ( p ) Π Π Π = + = +  
2 2 2 2
* *
A B
a a a a
( p ,p )
b b
γ γ












⇔ = .                            (12) 
 
Interestingly, we can see from (12) that the total profit of the monopolist increases if  γ  
increases. Put differently, the higher the market size in country A for a given a the higher is 
the monopolist’s total profit under a regime of national exhaustion and price discrimination. 
Comparing  (6)  to  (9)  we  find  that  the  difference  between  the  profit-maximizing  price  in 
country A and the profit-maximizing price in country B increases if countries are increasingly 
heterogeneous. 
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4.2.2 Double marginalization game without parallel imports 
  As already noted in section 3.1, a major determinant of parallel trade elaborated in the 
formal  literature  on  parallel  trade  is  that  multinational  firms  that  build  markets  through 
exclusive territorial dealership and distribution rights may find it difficult to enforce private 
contractual provisions that prohibit parallel trade outside the authorized distribution chain.
65 
For instance, recent EU case law suggests that a private contractual provision prohibiting 
parallel trade, at least within the common market, would be void.
66 To give an example, a 
German pharmaceutical company that sells a patented pharmaceutical product at low prices to 
Portugal while charging a high price in Germany cannot prevent parallel trade simply by 
declaring that the export product is “not for re-sale in Germany”. 
  In  game-theoretic  parlance,  suppose  that  the  manufacturing  firm  can  itself  become 
involved in the retail of the pharmaceutical product in country A, but sells the product in 
country B through an exclusive distributor. Furthermore, we assume that the distributor in 
country B has a monopoly on the retailing business in country B.
67 We make the simplifying 
assumption that retailing in country B does not involve any cost, except for the cost incurred 
by the distributor in buying the units of the pharmaceutical product from the manufacturing 
firm.  Demand  for  the  pharmaceutical  product  at  the  retail  level  is  given  by  the  demand 
curve B B B D ( p ) a bp = − , where  B p  is the retail price in country B. 
  In the first stage, the manufacturing firm sets a wholesale price 
w
B p  for the distributor, and 
the distributor sets a price  B p  for the retail trade in country B in the second stage.
68 To keep 
matters  simple,  we  will  first  assume  that  the  distributor  is  not  allowed  to  re-import  the 
pharmaceutical product into country A, and that arbitrage by individual consumers between 
the two countries is prohibited. The distributor is quoted a wholesale price 
w
B p , which the 
distributor must pay per unit at wholesale.  
  Using  backward  induction  we  start  with  the  second  stage.  In  the  second  stage,  the 
distributor chooses which retail price  B p  he will charge his customers in country B. The 
                                                 
65 See Maskus (2000b, pp. 231) and Maskus and Chen (2004). 
66 The following references to cases are to those of the ECJ. See Case C-187/80 Merck & Co. Inc. vs. Stephar 
B.V. and Petrus Stephanus Exler. See also Case C-56/64 Etablissements Consten S.A. and Grundigverkaufs-
GmbH. vs. E.E.C. Commission, and Case C-78/70 Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH. vs. Metro-SB-
Grossmärkte  GmbH  &  Co.  K.G..  See  also  Joined  Cases  C-267-268/95  Merck  &  Co.  Inc.  and  Others  vs. 
Primecrown Limited and Others. 
67 For an example of a monopoly selling to another monopoly see Kreps (1990, pp. 309). 
68 See Spengler (1950). See also Kreps, (1994, pp. 273) and Tirole (1995, pp. 379). 
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distributor, facing wholesale price 
w
B p , will treat 
w
B p  as his marginal cost and will set  B p  to 






B B B B p max p p D ( p ) − .                               (13) 
 























⇔ = .                                  (14) 
 





w w B B
B B
a bp a bp
p p a b
b b
π
      + +
= − −              
 











⇔ = .                               (15) 
 
In the first stage, the manufacturing firm sets the wholesale price at 
w
B p , anticipating that the 
distributor will purchase 
2
w
B a bp −
. Hence the manufacturer’s profit generated in country B, 
w
B B ( p ) Π ,















B B B B
a b
( p ) p p Π ⇔ = −                              (16) 
 
which gives the following first order condition 
                                                 
69 Note that the manufacturer’s profit is denoted by Π  and the distributor’s profit by π , respectively. 




A A ( p ) a b Π γ = . See (12). 
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⇔ = .                                    (17) 
 












B B p p ⇔ = .                                    (18) 
 
We can see from (18) that the distributor marks up the price of the pharmaceutical product by 
50 per cent, compared to the wholesale price 
w*
B p . However, if the manufacturer were directly 
engaged in the retail business in country B, he would set a price 
*
B a p 2b = , as elaborated in 
the  previous  section.  Put  differently,  if  the  manufacturer  were  to  sell  the  pharmaceutical 
product directly, more would be sold at a lower price than when the manufacturer must go 
through a distributor that has a monopoly on the retailing business in country B. 








Π = .                                      (19) 
 






π = .                                      (20) 
 
So far, we have assumed that the distributor is not allowed to re-import quantities of the 
pharmaceutical product into country A, i.e. under a global regime of national exhaustion. In 
the following section, we relax this assumption and allow for parallel imports, in order to 
explore the important strategic decision faced by the manufacturer as to at which wholesale 
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price the pharmaceutical product is sold to the distributor in country B, anticipating that part 
of the quantities sold can be re-imported. 
 
4.2.3 Double marginalization game with parallel imports 
  The  main  purpose  of  the  double  marginalization  game  with  complete  information 
elaborated in this section is to analyze the pricing strategies of the manufacturing firm m and 
the exclusive distributor r. In particular, I wish to analyze the question as to whether parallel 
imports may or may not occur in equilibrium. 
  In the first stage, the manufacturing firm chooses the wholesale price 
w
B p  at which it sells 
the pharmaceutical product to the distributor in country B. 
  In the second stage, the distributor chooses the retail price  B p  in country B. 
In the third stage, the monopolist and the distributor simultaneously choose the price at which 
they sell the product in country A in a Bertrand duopoly model. 
  We solve the game starting with the last stage and working backwards to the first stage, in 
order to look for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. 
 
4.2.3.1 Backward induction 
  We start with the last stage where the manufacturer and the distributor play a Bertrand 
game and simultaneously choose prices for the pharmaceutical product in country A.
71 We 
assume  that  the  pharmaceutical  product  re-imported  by  the  distributor  from  country  B  to 
country A is a perfect substitute for the product sold by the manufacturing firm in country A. 
In looking for the Bertrand equilibrium this section will demonstrate different scenarios in 
terms of the prices the manufacturer and the distributor are charging, as well as in terms of the 
demand they are serving in country A, whereby prices and demand served must be consistent 
with the following rules:
72 if the manufacturer and the distributor charge unequal prices, the 
demand served by the low-price firm must equal all demand at that price. Furthermore, the 
high-price firm gets no sales. However, if the manufacturer and the distributor charge the 
same price, total market demand is equally divided between them. Let us suppose that the 
quantity consumers demand from the manufacturer is 
 
                                                 
71 See Bertrand (1883). See also Feess (2000, pp. 411). See also footnote 61 for various arguments in support of 
the application of a Bertrand framework instead of a Cournot framework. 
72 See Kreps (1990, p. 331). 
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a bp    if p <p   
a bp
q   if p =p   





−  = 

 
                             (21) 











a bp    if p <p   
a bp
q   if p =p   





−  = 

 
                             (22) 
 
By  assumption  the  manufacturer  has  fixed  cost  of  zero  and  marginal  cost  of  zero. 
Furthermore,  we  assume  that  the  distributor  also  has  fixed  cost  of  zero.  However,  by 
assumption, the distributor treats the sum of the wholesale price 
w
B p  and the per unit cost of 
engaging  in  parallel  trade  t  as  his  marginal  cost  of  selling  the  pharmaceutical  product  in 
country A in the third stage. 
  First we note that price can never be less than marginal cost, since then either firm would 
increase its profits by producing less. On the one hand, the manufacturer  could supply  a 
positive quantity of the product as long as the price is non-negative, as his marginal costs are 
zero. On the other hand, the distributor would not charge a price smaller than his marginal 
cost 
w
B p t + . Hence, the manufacturer can monopolize the market in country A and steal all of 
the customers from the parallel importing distributor by setting a price that is infinitesimally 
smaller than the marginal cost of the distributor. Put differently, the manufacturer will always 
set the price 
m w
A B p p t < + . Consequently, the distributor will not stay in the market in country 
A and will not engage in parallel trade. At this point we can already formulate one of the main 
results of the analysis of the double marginalization game with complete information. 
Result 1   Parallel imports will never occur in any sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium in a 
double marginalization game with complete information and Bertrand price competition in 
the last stage. 
 
Note that this result holds for any non-negative 
w
B p  and any positive t. 
  In the second stage, the distributor anticipates that he will be driven out of the market in 
country A in the third stage. Hence the maximization problem of the distributor is identical to 
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the maximization problem we have already discussed in section 4.2.2 [see (13)-(15)]. The 
distributor  will  choose  a  price  2
w





B a bp / b π = − . 
  Working backwards to the first stage, the maximization problem of the manufacturer is to 
maximize the total profit generated in country A and country B, subject to the constraint stated 
in 
m w
A B p p t ≤ +
73 and subject to the non-negativity restrictions stated in  0
m
A p ≥  and  0
w
B p ≥ . 
Mathematically, what the constraint and the non-negativity restrictions do is to narrow the 
range of the profit function. After the constraints are added we can admit only those values of 
m
A p   and 
w
B p   which  satisfy  the  constraints.  Note  that  we  have  to  adopt  the  Kuhn-Tucker 
Method to find a maximum, as we are dealing with an optimization problem with inequality 
constraints.  In  fact,  the  Kuhn-Tucker  Method  is  just  a  generalization  of  the  Lagrange-
Multiplier  Method  for  optimization  problems  with  inequality  constraints.
74  Adopting  the 
Kuhn-Tucker Method, we first have to identify the maximization problem. Secondly, we will 
define the Lagrange function by multiplying each constraint with the corresponding Lagrange 
multiplier and by adding it to the original profit function. And thirdly, we will derive the first-
order conditions that a solution for the maximization problem must satisfy. 




m w m m w B
A B A A B
a-bp




= −  
 
 
subject to       0
and                0













                              (23) 
 
Second, let us write the classical type of the Lagrangian function, L, as follows 
 
( ) ( ) 1 2 3 1 2 3
w
m w m m w m w w m B
A B A A B A B B A
a-bp
L( p ,p ; , , ) a bp p  +p p p t p p
2
λ λ λ γ λ λ λ
 
= − + + + + −  
 
  (24) 
 
Third, we obtain the following first-order conditions: 
                                                 
73Note that the manufacturer always sets a price in country A that undercuts the distributor’s marginal costs. The 
manufacturer undercuts the distributor’s marginal cost at least by an infinitely smallε . 
74 See Kuhn and Tucker (1951). See also Chiang (1984, pp. 722), and Eichberger (2004, pp. 402). 
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= − + − =
∂











= − + + =
∂
                             (26) 
1 0
m
A p , λ =                                       (27) 
2 0
w
B p , λ =                                       (28) 
( ) 3 0
w m
B A t p p . λ + − =                                   (29) 
0 0
m w
A B p ,p , ≥ ≥                                     (30) 
0
w m
B A t p p . + − ≥                                    (31) 
1 2 3 0 0 0 , , , λ λ λ ≥ ≥ ≥                                  (32) 
 
We must now find solutions ( ) 1 2 3
m w
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ  that can satisfy all conditions given by (25)-
(32). Therefore it is appropriate to discuss various cases that differ as to the extent to which 
the constraints are binding. For instance, if  1 0 λ > , it follows from (27) that  0
m
A p = . To give 
another example, if  0
m
A p > , it follows from (27) that  1 0 λ = .
75 As we have three Lagrange 
multipliers  1 2 3 , , λ λ λ  that are either positive or equal to zero, we have to distinguish between 
nine different cases. 
  After checking each of the nine cases with regard to the question as to whether it satisfies 
all  conditions  given  by  (25)-(32)  we  obtain  two  solutions:  ( ) 1 2 3
m* w* * * *
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ   and 
( ) 1 2 3
m** w** ** ** **
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ . The first solution is given by: 
 
                                                 
75 The conditions which imply that either the Lagrange multiplier is zero or a constraint binding are called 
complementary slackness conditions. 
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  = + +  
 
  = + −  
 
=  
  =  
 
= − −  
 
 
                              (33) 
 
We  can  see  from  (33)  that  the  optimal  price  the  manufacturer  sets  in  country  A  always 
exceeds the optimal wholesale price the manufacturer charges the distributor in country B, as 
1 γ >  and  0 t > . Furthermore, we can see from (33) that the optimal wholesale price decreases 
if t increases, and that the optimal price the manufacturer sets in country A increases if t 
increases, respectively. Put differently, the higher the parallel trade cost t for a given γ  and 
thus the less profitable parallel trade the higher is 
m*
A p  and the lower
w*
B p . 
  However, we can also see from (33) that the non-negativity restriction for 3
* λ  is only 














γ ⇔ ≤ − .                                  (34) 
 
To  conclude  the  discussion  with  respect  to  the  first  solution,  the  outcome 
( ) 1 2 3
m* w* * * *
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ  given by (33) only satisfies each of the eight conditions given by (25)-





γ ≤ − .





γ > − ,  i.e.  for  high  parallel  trade  cost  and  a 
relatively low  γ ,  ( ) 1 2 3
m* w* * * *
A B p ,p , , , λ λ λ  is not a solution for the maximization problem given 
                                                 
76 See Annex I.3 for the proof that for the non-negativity restriction for
w*
B p  to be satisfied it is sufficient that the 
non-negativity restriction for  3
* λ  is satisfied. 
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by (23), due to the fact that the non-negativity restriction for  3
* λ  would not be satisfied. Thus 
we have to consider the second solution ( ) 1 2 3
m** w** ** ** **






























  =  
 
  =  
 
=  





                                    (35) 
 
When we compare (35) with (6) and (17), we find that 
m**
A p  is equal to the monopoly price in 
a double marginalization game without parallel imports,
77 and 
w**
B p  is equal to the profit-
maximizing  wholesale  price  in  a  double  marginalization  game  without  parallel  imports, 
respectively.  Intuitively,  if  the  two  countries  are  virtually  homogeneous  ( 1 γ → )  and  the 





γ > − , the distributor will not be willing to engage 





γ > − , the outcome of the double marginalization 
game  with  parallel  imports  is  equal  to  the  outcome  of  the  double  marginalization  game 
without parallel imports. 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
  To conclude this section, parallel imports in a double marginalization game with complete 
information will never occur in the sub-game perfect equilibrium, as it is always beneficial for 
the manufacturer to monopolize the market in country A at the third stage. The fact that the 
manufacturer’s marginal costs are lower than the distributor’s marginal costs of engaging in 
parallel  trade  is  decisive  in  this  regard.  However,  the  question  arises  as  to  how  the 
manufacturer strategically chooses prices in order to prevent the occurrence of parallel trade.  
                                                 
77 Note that the monopoly price in country A in a double marginalization game without parallel imports is equal 
to the monopoly price under third-degree price discrimination given by (6). 
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  As I have shown, this depends on the level of the parameters γ  and t for given values for 





γ > − , potential competition from parallel trade does not arise and thus the 




γ =   in  country  A  and  the 
optimal wholesale price  2
w**
B a p b =  in country B. One tentative interpretation of this outcome 
is  that  parallel  trade  is  a  non-credible  threat  if  parallel  trade  cost  are  high  and  the  two 





γ ≤ − ,  potential 
competition from parallel trade arises and the manufacturer strategically sets the wholesale 
price in country B and the price in country A, in order to prevent that parallel trade occurs. 
  Nevertheless, given the fact that we have shown that parallel imports do not occur in the 
equilibrium  of  a  game  with  complete  information,  the  question  arises  as  to  why  we  can 
actually observe parallel imports in international trade. One answer to this puzzle might be 
that  either  the  distributor  has  better  information  on  local  demand  in  country  B  than  the 
manufacturer, or that the manufacturer has better information on local demand in country A 
than the distributor. This idea for further research will be discussed in the following section. 
 
5   Ideas for Further Research 
5.1 Double Marginalization Game with Asymmetric Information 
  As we can see from the previous section, in a double marginalization game with complete 
information  parallel  imports  will  never  occur  in  equilibrium  and  the  monopolistic 
manufacturer  can  always  monopolize  the  market  in  country  A  by  undercutting  the 
distributor’s price. However, this result may change in a game with incomplete information 
with regard to local demand functions.
78 For instance, the manufacturer may overestimate or 
underestimate the size of the market in country B, or the distributor may overestimate or 
underestimate the size of the market in country A. 
  Therefore, I propose to transform the game mentioned above into a Bayesian game with 
incomplete information by introducing Nature as a player in the game and by introducing 
                                                 
78 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1996, pp. 209). See also Vega-Redondo (2003, pp. 336). 
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moves by Nature that determine the type of demand in country B and the type of demand in 
country A, respectively.
79 
  In the transformed game, the manufacturer’s incomplete information about the type of 
demand in country B becomes imperfect information about Nature’s moves with regard to 
country B. Moreover, the distributor’s incomplete information about the type of demand in 
country A becomes imperfect information about Nature’s moves with regard to demand in 
country A, so that the transformed game can be analyzed through standard techniques.
80 The 
introduction of moves by Nature is reasonable and realistic, as it simply means that local 
sellers of goods have better information on local demand than sellers from abroad.
81 
  The main purpose of this section is to explore the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1:   Depending  on  Nature’s  choices  with  regard  to  local  demand  functions 
parallel imports may occur in equilibrium. 
 
I suggest a multi-stage double marginalization game with incomplete information that may 
have the following time structure: 
  In the first stage, the monopolistic manufacturer chooses the price at which he charges the 
distributor in country B. However, the manufacturer can only form expectations about the 
distributor’s pricing decision as Nature resolves its uncertainty with regard to the demand 
function in country B, after he has already made his decision. 
  In the second stage, Nature chooses the demand in country A and country B. On the one 
hand, only the distributor knows Nature’s exact choice with regard to demand in country B. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  manufacturer  has  superior  information  with  regard  to  demand  in 
country A. 
  In the third stage, the distributor chooses the price he charges his customers in country B. 
In the fourth stage, manufacturer and distributor play a Bertrand game of price competition. 
                                                 
79 See Harsanyi (1967-68). In a Bayesian game players are seeking to maximize their expected payoff, given 
their beliefs about the other players. 
80 For a Bayesian Nash-Equilibrium with two players see Feess (2000). See also Gibbons (1992) and Holler and 
Illing (2003). 
81 I thank Eberhard Feess for his comment on this aspect. See also Gallini and Hollis (1999, p. 2). 
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 Annex: 
Annex I.1   Pharmaceutical sales in 2004 
 
Company  Pharmaceutical sales, 
in billion dollars (2004) 
Headquartered in 
Pfizer  55.1  USA 
GlaxoSmithKline   32.8  UK, USA 
Sanofi-Aventis  27.4  France 
Johnson&Johnson  24.7  USA 
Merck  23.9  USA 
Novartis  22.9  Switzerland 
AstraZeneca  21.7  UK 
Roche  17.8  Switzerland 
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 
15.6  USA 
Wyeth  14.3  USA 
Abbott 
Laboratories 
14.3  USA 
Eli Lilly  12.7  USA 
Schering-Plough  6.9  USA 
Bayer  6.4  Germany 
 
Sources: IMS Health; www.pharmacy.org; Thomson Datastream 
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Annex I.2   Summary of exhaustion regimes in 28 developing and least-
developed countries 
 
Country   Exhaustion regime 
Argentina  International exhaustion 
Barbados  National exhaustion 
Belize  National exhaustion 
Bolivia  International exhaustion 
Botswana  National exhaustion 
Brazil  National exhaustion 
Colombia  International exhaustion 
Costa Rica  International exhaustion 
Dominican Republic  International exhaustion 
Guatemala  International exhaustion 
Honduras  International exhaustion 
India  International exhaustion 
Madagascar  National exhaustion 
Malaysia  International exhaustion 
Mexico  National exhaustion 
Morocco  National exhaustion 
Namibia  National exhaustion 
Nicaragua  International exhaustion 
Nigeria  National exhaustion 
Peru  International exhaustion 
Phillipines  National exhaustion 
Republic of Korea  International exhaustion 
South Africa  International exhaustion 
Sri Lanka  International exhaustion 
Suriname  National exhaustion 
Tunisia  International exhaustion 
Uruguay  International exhaustion 
Venezuela  International exhaustion 
 
Source: WIPO (based on notifications made by Members to the WTO), Kanavos et al. (2004, 
p. 39), Maskus and Chen (2002, p. 322), Thorpe (2002, pp. 29), and Garrison (2006, pp. 53). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Annex I.3   Proof with respect to the non-negativity restriction for the 
equilibrium wholesale price in country B 
In the following we show that for the non-negativity restriction for 
w*
B p  to be satisfied it is 
sufficient that the non-negativity restriction for  3























γ ⇔ ≤ +  





γ ⇔ ≤ + . 
Hence, the non-negativity restriction for 
w*
B p  is satisfied if the non-negativity restriction for 
3




γ γ + > −  and 1>-2. 
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